NBER Macroeconomics Annual

We study the evolution of profits, investment, and market shares in US industries over the past 40 years. During the 1990s, and at low levels of initial concentration, we find evidence of efficient concentration driven by tougher price competition, intangible investment, and increasing productivity of leaders. After 2000, however, the evidence suggests inefficient concentration, decreasing competition, and increasing barriers to entry as leaders become more entrenched and concentration is associated with lower investment, higher prices, and lower productivity growth.

White, non-college-educated Americans born in the 1960s face shorter life expectancies, higher medical expenses, and lower wages per unit of human capital compared with those born in the 1940s; men’s wages declined more than women’s. After documenting these changes, we use a life-cycle model of couples and singles to evaluate their effects. The drop in wages depressed the labor supply of men and increased that of women, especially in married couples. Their shorter life expectancy reduced their retirement savings, but the increase in out-of-pocket medical expenses increased savings by more. Welfare losses, measured as a onetime asset compensation, are 12.5%, 8%, and 7.2% of the present discounted value of earnings for single men, couples, and single women, respectively. Lower wages explain 47%–58% of these losses, shorter life expectancies 25%–34%, and higher medical expenses account for the rest.

We evaluate the hypothesis that the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint was, in practice, irrelevant during the recent ZLB episode experienced by the US economy (the 2009Q1–2015Q4 period). We focus on two dimensions of economic performance that were ex ante likely to have been affected by a binding ZLB: (i) the volatility of macro variables and (ii) the economy’s response to shocks. Using a variety of empirical methods, we find little evidence against the irrelevance hypothesis, with our estimates suggesting that the responses of output, inflation, and the long-term interest rate were hardly affected by the binding ZLB constraint. We show how a shadow interest rate rule (which we take as a proxy for forward guidance) can reconcile our empirical findings with the predictions of a simple New Keynesian model with a ZLB constraint.

Several academics and practitioners have pointed out that inflation follows a seemingly exogenous statistical process, unrelated to the output gap, leading some to argue that the Phillips curve has weakened or disappeared. In this paper, we explain why this seemingly exogenous process arises, or, in other words, why it is difficult to empirically identify a Phillips curve, a key building block of the policy framework used by central banks. We show why this result need not imply that the Phillips curve does not hold—on the contrary, our conceptual framework is built under the assumption that the Phillips curve always holds. The reason is simple: if monetary policy is set with the goal of minimizing welfare losses (measured as the sum of deviations of inflation from its target and output from its potential), subject to a Phillips curve, a central bank will seek to increase inflation when output is below potential. This targeting rule will impart a negative correlation between inflation and the output gap, blurring the identification of the (positively sloped) Phillips curve. We discuss different strategies to circumvent the identification problem and present evidence of a robust Phillips curve in US data.

We study the impact on the skill premium of increases in the quality of goods consumed by households (“trading up”). Our empirical work shows that high-quality goods are more intensive in skilled labor than low-quality goods and that household spending on high-quality goods rises with income. We propose a model consistent with these facts. This model accounts for the past rise in the skill premium with more plausible rates of skill-biased technical change than those required by the canonical model. It also implies that an expansion of the skilled labor force reduces the skill premium by much less than in the canonical model.

Chinese local governments wield their enormous political power and administrative capacity to provide “special deals” for favored private firms. We argue that China’s extraordinary economic growth comes from these special deals. Local political leaders do so because they derive personal benefits, either political or monetary, from providing special deals. Competition between local governments limits the predatory effects of special deals.