NBER Macroeconomics Annual

It is common to analyze the effects of alternative possible monetary policy commitments under the assumption of optimization under rational (or fully model-consistent) expectations. This implicitly assumes unrealistic cognitive abilities on the part of economic decision makers. The relevant question, however, is not whether the assumption can be literally correct, but how much it would matter to model decision making in a more realistic way. A model is proposed, based on the architecture of artificial intelligence programs for problems such as chess or go, in which decision makers look ahead only a finite distance into the future and use a value function learned from experience to evaluate situations that may be reached after a finite sequence of actions by themselves and others. Conditions are discussed under which the predictions of a model with finite-horizon forward planning are similar to those of a rational expectations equilibrium, and under which they are instead quite different. The model is used to reexamine the consequences that should be expected from a central bank commitment to maintain a fixed nominal interest rate for a substantial period of time. “Neo-Fisherian” predictions are shown to depend on using rational expectations equilibrium analysis under circumstances in which it should be expected to be unreliable.

Banks’ ratio of the market value to book value of their equity was close to 1 until the 1990s, then more than doubled during the 1996–2007 period, and fell again to values close to 1 after the 2008 financial crisis. Some economists argue that the drop in banks’ market-to-book ratio since the crisis is due to a loss in bank franchise value or profitability. In this paper we argue that banks’ market-to-book ratio is the sum of two components: franchise value and the value of government guarantees. We empirically decompose the ratio between these two components and find that a large portion of the variation in this ratio over time is due to changes in the value of government guarantees.

Comparing US gross domestic product to the sum of measured payments to labor and imputed rental payments to capital results in a large and volatile residual or “factorless” income. We analyze three common strategies of allocating and interpreting factorless income, specifically that it arises from economic profits (case Π), unmeasured capital (case K), or deviations of the rental rate of capital from standard measures based on bond returns (case R). We are skeptical of case Π because it reveals a tight negative relationship between real interest rates and economic profits, leads to large fluctuations in inferred factor-augmenting technologies, and results in profits that have risen since the early 1980s but that remain lower today than in the 1960s and 1970s. Case K shows how unmeasured capital plausibly accounts for all factorless income in recent decades, but its value in the 1960s would have to be more than half of the capital stock, which we find less plausible. We view case R as most promising as it leads to more stable factor shares and technology growth than the other cases, though we acknowledge that it requires an explanation for the pattern of deviations from common measures of the rental rate. Using a model with multiple sectors and types of capital, we show that our assessment of the drivers of changes in output, factor shares, and functional inequality depends critically on the interpretation of factorless income.

Riskless interest rates fell in the wake of the financial crisis and have remained low. We explore a simple explanation: this recession was perceived as an extremely unlikely event before 2007. Observing such an episode led all agents to reassess macro risk, in particular the probability of tail events. Since changes in beliefs endure long after the event itself has passed, perceived “tail risk” remains high, generates a demand for riskless liquid assets, and continues to depress the riskless rate. We embed this mechanism into a simple production economy with liquidity constraints and use observable macro data, along with standard econometric tools, to discipline beliefs about the distribution of aggregate shocks. When agents observe an extreme adverse realization, they reestimate the distribution and attach a higher probability to such an event recurring. As a result, even transitory shocks have persistent effects because once observed, the shocks stay forever in the agents’ data set. We show that our belief revision mechanism can help explain the persistent nature of the fall in risk-free rates.

Using data from a variety of sources, this paper comprehensively documents the dramatic changes in the manufacturing sector and the large decline in employment rates and hours worked among prime-age Americans since 2000. We use cross-region variation to explore the link between declining manufacturing employment and labor market outcomes. We find that manufacturing decline in a local area in the 2000s had large and persistent negative effects on local employment rates, hours worked, and wages. We also show that declining local manufacturing employment is related to rising local opioid use and deaths. These results suggest that some of the recent opioid epidemic is driven by demand factors in addition to increased opioid supply. We conclude the paper with a discussion of potential mediating factors associated with declining manufacturing labor demand, including public and private transfer receipt, sectoral switching, and interregion mobility. We conclude that the decline in manufacturing employment was a substantial cause of the decline in employment rates during the 2000s, particularly for less educated prime-age workers. Given the trends in both capital and skill deepening within this sector, we further conclude that many policies currently being discussed to promote the manufacturing sector will have only a modest labor market impact for less educated individuals.

We analyze the dynamic macroeconomic effects of border adjustment taxes (BAT), both when they are a feature of corporate tax reform (C-BAT) and for the case of value-added tax (VAT). Our analysis arrives at the following main conclusions. First, C-BAT is unlikely to be neutral at the macroeconomic level, as the conditions required for neutrality are unrealistic. The basis for neutrality of VAT is even weaker. Second, in response to the introduction of an unanticipated permanent C-BAT of 20% in the United States, the dollar appreciates strongly, by almost the size of the tax adjustment, and US exports and imports decline significantly, while the overall effect on output is small. Third, an equivalent change in VAT, in contrast to the C-BAT effect, generates only a weak appreciation of the dollar and a small decline in imports and exports, but has a large negative effect on output. Last, border taxes increase government revenues in periods of trade deficit; however, given the net foreign asset position of the United States, they result in a long-run loss of government revenues and an immediate net transfer to the rest of the world.