This paper introduces a new approach to the empirical testing of the Lucas-Sargent-Wallace (LSW) "policy ineffectiveness proposition," which compares the LSW hypothesis with an alternative that states that prices respond fully in the long run, but only gradually in the short run, to nominal aggregate demand disturbances. The empirical equations, estimated for a new set of quarterly data extending back to 1890, exhibit uniformly high responses of real output and low responses of price changes to anticipated changes in nominal GNP. The paper compares and tests three alternative methods of introducing "persistence effects" into the LSW framework.

This paper reexamines some recent tests of whether holders of shares with higher dividend yields receive higher risk-adjusted rates of return to compensate for the heavier taxes on dividend payments than on long-term capital gains. Our particular concern is with tests using short-run measures of dividend yield--that is, measures that seek to deduce the differential tax burden on dividends over long-term capital gains from differences in rates of return on shares that do not pay a cash dividend during the return interval. We show that such measures are inappropriate for that purpose. Any yield-related effects associated with such measures must arise from sources other than the long-term tax differential. For the short-run measures considered here, the yield-related effects found in some tests are traced to biases, one of a fairly subtle kind, introduced by dividend announcement effects.

It is found that the welfare gain per unit of revenue raised is maximized for an export tariff on technology transfer, followed by an import tariff on goods, with an export tariff on goods the poorest policy alternative. These results are derived within a monopolistic competition model, where the production of any good requires some initial research and development (R&D), and technology transfer occurs when R&D is done in one country for production of goods in the other. An intuitive explanation is presented, based on the public-good nature of R&D and also the elasticity of demand for technologies from firms.

Informational asymmetries can play a key role in explaining the existence and nature of multiperiod contracts. In an illustrative risk-sharing model even relatively short (two-period) contracts can be mutually beneficial if there is private information, though one-period contracts suffice otherwise. Further, contracts which are Pareto optimal relative to the environment and the information structure are defined and partially characterized. An example illustrates how otherwise inefficient intertemporal tie-ins can be used optimally to mitigate incentive problems. The obvious borrowing-lending schemes are not private-information Pareto optimal; in these, period-by-period actions are not sufficiently constrained. Discounting affects the form of the optimal contract but none of these qualitative conclusions.

It has often been argued that prices are sticky in the United States. However, the empirical papers that have claimed to support this view have not reflected any formal behavioral theory. This paper presents a theory that justifies price stickiness, namely, that firms, fearing to upset their customers, attribute a cost to price changes. The rational expectations equilibrium of an economy with many such firms is presented, estimated with postwar U.S. data, and tested against alternative hypotheses. The results largely support the model. Furthermore, the hypothesis that prices are not sticky is rejected by U.S. data.

Two competing monetary policy prescriptions are analyzed within the context of overlapping generations models. The real-bills prescription is for unfettered private intermediation or central bank operations designed to produce the effects of such intermediation. The quantity-theory prescription, in contrast, is for restrictions on private intermediation designed to separate "money" from credit. Although our models are consistent with quantity-theory predictions about money supply and price-level behavior under these two policy prescriptions, the models imply that the quantity-theory prescription is not Pareto optimal and the real-bills prescription is.

We defend Adam Smith's theory of the firm from the standpoint of positive economics. We argue that his evaluation of the joint-stock firm was not moralistic but instead based on available empirical evidence. The record showed that joint-stock companies had a poor survivorship record, even when granted legal monopoly status. His analysis contained an explanation of the role of agency costs within the firm. Finally, he did not discuss the East India Company as an ordinary joint-stock firm but rather as an aberrant form created by government.

This study focuses on the role of wages and rents in allocating workers to locations with various quantities of amenities. The theory demonstrates that if the amenity is also productive, then the sign of the wage gradient is unclear while the rent gradient is positive. The theory is extended to include the housing market and nontraded goods. These extensions require little modification of the conclusion. The empirical work on wages shows that the regional wage differences can be explained largely by these local attributes. With the use of site price data, implicit prices are estimated and quality of life rankings for the cities are computed.

Noting that a suggested measure of natural resource scarcity, resource rent, is unobservable, we show that rent is linked to (observable) marginal exploration cost. A two-period model of extraction and exploration reveals that rent is equal to this cost when discovery is certain. Under risky exploration, cost data can be used to bound rent. The model also indicates how exploration uncertainty affects the competitive firm's extraction and exploration decisions. Finally, the behavior of U.S. oil and gas exploration costs suggests that these costs were rising in the postwar era, which has different implications for scarcity than indicated by other measures of scarcity.