Journal of Labor Economics

We explore the role of composition, duration dependence, and labor force nonparticipation in accounting for the sharp increase in the incidence of long-term unemployment (LTU) during the Great Recession. We show that compositional shifts account for very little of the observed increase in LTU. Using panel data from the Current Population Survey for 2002–7, we calibrate a matching model that allows for duration dependence in unemployment and transitions between employment, unemployment, and nonparticipation. The calibrated model accounts for almost all of the increase in LTU and much of the observed outward shift in the Beveridge curve between 2008 and 2013.

We study employment reallocation across employers through the lens ofa dynamic job ladder model. Workers always agree on a ranking ofemployers at all points in time and search for better jobs both offand on the job. A parsimonious version of the model fits well the timeseries of gross worker flows by employer size from newly available USdata from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey. Focusing on the US experience in and around the Great Recession, our evidence indicates that the job ladder stopped working then and has not fully resumed yet.

This paper looks at the surprisingly different labor market performance of the United States, Canada, Germany, and several other OECD countries during and after the Great Recession of 2008–9. A first important finding is that the large employment swings in the construction sector linked to the boom and bust in US housing markets is an important factor behind the different labor market performances of the three countries. We also find that cross-country differences among OECD countries are consistent with a conventional Okun relationship linking gross domestic product growth to employment performance.

Even before the Great Recession, US employment growth was unimpressive. Between 2000 and 2007, the economy gave back the considerable employment gains achieved during the 1990s, with a historic contraction in manufacturing employment being a prime contributor to the slump. We estimate that import competition from China, which surged after 2000, was a major force behind both recent reductions in US manufacturing employment and—through input-output linkages and other general equilibrium channels—weak overall US job growth. Our central estimates suggest job losses from rising Chinese import competition over 1999–2011 in the range of 2.0–2.4 million.

This paper argues that several of the poor labor market outcomes observed in the Great Recession can be traced back to a change in the demand pattern for skilled workers that started with the tech bust of 2000. In particular, we show that around the year 2000, the demand for cognitive tasks underwent a reversal. In response, high-skilled workers moved down the occupational ladder and increasingly displaced lower-educated workers in less skill-intensive jobs. While these effects were present before the financial crisis of 2008, they became more obvious after jobs associated with the housing bubble disappeared.

Using 1979–2012 CPS data for the United States and 1975–2012 NES data for Great Britain, we study wage behavior in both countries, with particular attention to the Great Recession. Real wages are procyclical in both countries, but the procyclicality of real wages varies across recessions, and does so differently between the two countries, in ways that defy simple explanations. We devote particular attention to the hypothesis that downward nominal wage rigidity plays an important role in cyclical employment and unemployment fluctuations. We conclude that downward wage rigidity may be less binding and have lesser allocative consequences than is often supposed.

The high pace of reallocation across producers is pervasive in the US economy. Evidence shows that this high pace of reallocation is closely linked to productivity. While these patterns hold on average, the extent to which the reallocation dynamics in recessions are “cleansing” is an open question. We find that downturns prior to the Great Recession are periods of accelerated reallocation even more productivity enhancing than reallocation in normal times. In the Great Recession, we find that the intensity of reallocation fell rather than rose and that the reallocation that did occur was less productivity enhancing than in prior recessions.

Why did productivity rise during recent recessions? One possibility is that average worker quality increased. A second is that each incumbent worker produced more. The second effect is termed “making do with less.” Using data from 2006 to 2010 on individual worker productivity from a large firm, these effects can be measured and separated. For this firm, most of the gain in productivity during the recession was a result of increased effort. Additionally, the increase in effort is correlated with the increase in the local unemployment rate, presumably reflecting the costs of losing a job.

We measure impacts of entry conditions on labor market outcomes for the US college graduating classes of 1974–2011. A large recession reduces initial earnings by 10%, through full-time work and wages, with small persistent impacts on wages. Those in high-paying majors experience smaller impacts on most labor market outcomes, widening earnings inequality across majors. In the Great Recession, early earnings losses are much larger than predicted given past patterns and the size of the recession. This is partially because the cyclical sensitivity of demand for college graduates has more than doubled. Recession effects also became more evenly distributed across majors.

Much attention has been given to the large increases in safety net spending during the Great Recession. We examine the relationship between poverty, the safety net, and business cycles historically and test whether there has been a significant change in this relationship. We find that post–welfare reform, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families did not respond during the Great Recession and extreme poverty is more cyclical than in prior recessions. Food Stamps and Unemployment Insurance are providing more protection—or no less protection—in the Great Recession, and there is some evidence of less cyclicality for 100% poverty.

Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) awards rise during recessions. If marginal applicants are able to work but unable to find jobs, countercyclical Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefit extensions may reduce SSDI uptake. Exploiting UI extensions in the Great Recession as a source of variation, we find no indication that expiration of UI benefits causes SSDI applications and can rule out effects of meaningful magnitude. A supplementary analysis finds little overlap between the two programs’ recipient populations: only 28% of SSDI awardees had any labor force attachment in the prior calendar year, and of those, only 4% received UI.