This article argues for an expansion of the egalitarian toolbox for critiquing systems of education. It begins by examining familiar egalitarian approaches to equality of opportunity and social justice before examining more recent approaches to expanding the egalitarian toolbox defended by Elizabeth Anderson and Debra Satz. It argues that while both the familiar and new approaches form an important part of the egalitarian toolbox, they both have limitations which call for an approach to educational justice more directly concerned with social equality. The article then develops such an approach informed by sociological work on social class and social status.

Should punishment be abated for offenders suffering from amnesia? Philosophers have largely overlooked this question. Extant views cluster around a straightforward answer: deserving punishment depends on remembering one’s crime. However, arguments for that view rely on implausible assumptions; the view also implies that offenders could manipulate how much punishment they deserve. Instead, uneasiness about punishing amnesiacs should be traced to distinctive grounds for showing mercy. Amnesiacs who cannot access their past motives are unable to fully comprehend their own role in bringing punishment upon themselves and unable to situate their decisions within a satisfying narrative arc of their lives.

This article seeks to shed light on debates about the right to be forgotten by offering a new account of the right as grounded in the confidence that the direction of one’s life is up to one and worth the trouble that it takes to direct it. I show how this confidence is supported by what the right actually provides: the possibility of new social interactions unconditioned by information about one’s past. This view avoids pitfalls facing other accounts of the right’s moral basis, clarifies its relation to rights of privacy, and resolves several puzzles thought to face its practical application.

Critics often accuse Kant and Kantians of rigorism: of advocating highly general exceptionless principles of duty that strictly prohibit action kinds like lying or breaking promises. In this article, I draw on arguments from the generalism-particularism debate to show that the way in which Kantians usually understand universality prevents them from solving this problem and leaves them stuck in a trilemma. I then argue that they should abandon this common conception—the “strict conception,” on which universal principles don’t permit any exceptions—in favor of a “relaxed conception,” on which universal principles do permit certain exceptions, namely principled exceptions.

Longtermists have recently argued that it is overwhelmingly important to do what we can to mitigate existential risks to humanity. I consider three mistakes that are often made in calculating the value of existential risk mitigation. I show how correcting these mistakes pushes the value of existential risk mitigation substantially below leading estimates, potentially low enough to threaten the normative case for existential risk mitigation. I use this discussion to draw four positive lessons for the study of existential risk.

I raise three problems for Pummer’s account of impermissible yet praiseworthy actions. First, Pummer does not offer a plausible account of the motives of his agents, and this presents a major obstacle to evaluating those agents’ conduct. Second, the success of his argument hinges on a problematic way of individuating actions. Finally, there is a better candidate for a type of action that is both praiseworthy and impermissible, but this candidate presents novel challenges for Pummer’s account.