Militarism and militarization have inspired opposition for millennia. In the post–World War II era, dozens of social movements challenging the existence and operation of US and other foreign (extraterritorial) military bases have provided a prominent example of antimilitarization activism. Movements from Okinawa, Japan, and Jeju, South Korea, to Vieques, Puerto Rico, and Vicenza, Italy, have struggled to close existing bases, stop the construction of new bases, and reduce or eliminate the harms that bases frequently inflict on local communities. This article reviews the history and effects of antibase movements, including recent efforts to create a global “No Bases” movement. While these movements have achieved varying degrees of success and had complicated impacts at individual, local, national, and global scales, this article shows that antibase movements collectively have been important actors in international geopolitics, with significant global influence. Specifically, movements have disrupted everyday military operations and reshaped the global deployment of US bases abroad. Antibase movements thus provide an example of how antimilitarization movements can check, slow, and in some cases reverse militarization—although militarization can continue after base closures. The article concludes with seven tentative hypotheses explaining why some antibase movements are more successful than others in achieving their stated aims.

In 1991 and 1992, the people of the Philippines forced the military of their former colonial ruler and the world’s only remaining superpower, the United States, to leave the two largest overseas US military bases. The US military had made Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base into the hub of its power in East Asia in the years following the seizure of the Philippines in the 1898 war with Spain. After granting independence to the Philippines in 1946, the United States kept the country in a state of neocolonial subordination by pressuring the former colony into granting a 99-year rent-free lease on 23 bases and military installations. At Subic Bay, Clark, and elsewhere, the United States effectively continued formal colonial rule, maintaining sovereignty as well as control over Filipino workers, criminal prosecutions, taxation, and the city of Olongapo, adjacent to Subic Bay.

After a people’s movement overthrew the United States’ authoritarian client President Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, an antibase movement pressured the Philippines Senate into refusing to renew a US base agreement expiring in 1991. The country’s newly drafted constitution banned foreign military bases. Less than 18 months after the June 1991 volcanic eruption of Mount Pinatubo badly damaged Clark Air Base, US bases and thousands of US troops were gone (Apostol 2012; Yeo 2011).

Since World War II, the United States has had a historically unprecedented collection of military bases on other countries’ soil. These extraterritorial bases have been a key, if oft overlooked, part of the world’s most powerful military force, along with the US nuclear arsenal and conventional forces. Still, the power of the US military has never been unchallengeable. The movement to remove the US military from the Philippines is just one of many social movements worldwide that have ”shown that a protest campaign focusing on stopping military activities can force the US military to leave a place they wanted to stay” (Davis 2011:219). Austria, Morocco, Trinidad, Libya, France, Ethiopia, Iran, Spain, Saudi Arabia, Ecuador, and Vieques, Puerto Rico, are a few of the more than 30 countries and territories in the post–World War II era where social movements led by ordinary citizens and, in some cases, politicians have forced the US military to close a base, blocked the construction or expansion of an installation, or won significant restrictions on base operations. (An extensive list of antibase movements, including basic information about movement composition, dates active, notable tactics, degree of success, and other outcomes, is available at https://bit.ly/2CUMcUg. I compiled the list for this article and have opened it to crowdsourced editing online [cf. Pettyjohn and Kavanagh 2016].)
Figure 1. Map of US military bases outside the 50 US states and Washington, DC, as of 2015 (Vine 2015).
Antibase movements have generally faced long odds because of the gaping power imbalances between most movements and the government, corporate, and elite actors arrayed in support of a foreign base presence (see fig. 3). Unsurprisingly, movements have achieved varying degrees of success. Some have struggled for decades with mixed results. For example, perhaps the world’s best-known antibase movement, in Okinawa, Japan, has failed to remove the most controversial US base there, almost 25 years after three US military personnel horrifically raped a 12-year-old, catapulting a decades-old movement into the international spotlight.

Scholars disagree about the relative significance of antibase movements and how much power they have to close, block, or otherwise constrain foreign bases. There is clear agreement that since the last years of the Cold War, US and other foreign bases have become increasingly embattled (Calder 2007), the subject of contentious debate in countries where foreign bases are found (Calder 2007; Harkavy 1989, 2007). However, some scholars suggest that movements have rarely shaped policy makers’ basing decisions (e.g., Cooley 2008; Kawato 2015; Yeo 2011). Others find that antibase movements have caused serious local challenges for military officials (Calder 2007), shaped the policy decisions of host nation and US elites, altered the geography of US military deployments, and “handcuffed American freedom of military action” (e.g., Bitar 2016; Davis 2011: 215, 223; Holmes 2014).

This article tries to contribute to this discussion while taking a broader view than most to consider the wide-ranging effects of antibase movements—beyond the question of whether a base is closed or other movement demands are met. The article draws on 17 years of research about foreign military bases and their global impacts (e.g., Vine 2009, 2015), including participant observation and archival and interview-based research in 14 countries and territories. Here, I focus on my research with antibase and some probase movements, as well as research about military strategists’ reactions to antibase opposition since the 1950s. I focus on antibase movements challenging US bases abroad because the vast majority of foreign base social movements have emerged in the post–World War II era and challenged US bases, which have accounted for the vast majority of the world’s extraterritorial bases.

Examining the history of antibase movements below, I conclude that such movements have had significant political-economic, military, and sociocultural impact at different scales ranging from the individual to the global. While different antibase movements have had different kinds of effects, with differing degrees of depth and breadth, movements have impacted: (1) people living in communities affected by foreign bases, including movement members; (2) other antibase movements internationally; (3) local, national, and international political-economic relations; and (4) US basing strategy and military operations.

Because military bases are a powerful material and symbolic manifestation of militarization, antibase movements are a useful example of an antimilitarization movement—a social movement that in some way challenges everyday military operations, the political-economic and sociocultural process of militarization, and/or ideologies of militarism. As the history

1. I conducted research in Ecuador, El Salvador, Germany, Guam (Guåhan), Guantánamo Bay, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Mauritius, Northern Mariana Islands, Seychelles, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Like all scholars, I am not unbiased. I began my work around military bases in August 2001, after lawyers representing the Chagossian people, exiled during the creation of the US base on Diego Garcia, asked me to document the effects of the Chagossians’ expulsion on their lives. After completing additional research about the history of Diego Garcia (Vine 2009), I began ethnographic research about the broad impacts of US bases abroad (e.g., Vine 2015). Antibase movements and some probase groups have been the source of interviewees, research data, and broader access to communities in most of my research sites. Like other scholars, I have spoken about my research to social movement organizations, including when invited to speak at antibase events. I have participated in and, at times, helped organize networks of scholars, activists, and others critical of foreign bases. This work has included helping to organize speaking tours for antibase activists, a 2009 national conference on US bases abroad, two online conferences linking movements globally, a US Chagossian support group, and a bipartisan group of US analysts concerned about bases abroad.

2. This article focuses on social movements that challenge foreign rather than domestic bases. The article does not completely exclude domestic base movements but adopts this common distinction because: (1) movements challenging foreign bases have defined themselves by their opposition to a foreign military presence, (2) these movements have built distinct connections and networks, with implications for other social movements and militarization, and (3) extraterritorial bases raise questions about sovereignty and imperialism that domestic bases generally do not.

3. Following Catherine Lutz (2002), I define militarization as a process through which the military, war, and preparations for war become increasingly important in a society, especially through increased societal spending on the military and war making. As Lutz says, militarization is “a process involv[ing] an intensification of the labor and resources allocated to military purposes . . . [and] a shift in general societal beliefs and values in ways necessary to legitimize the use of force, the organization of large standing armies and their leaders” (2002:723). Lutz shows how militarization has two central dimensions: (1) the material economic and political dimension, involving increased spending and labor allocation for the military and war making, and (2) the social, cultural, and ideological dimension, involving transformations in values, feelings, and societal ideas about the military and war.

4. Antimilitarization movements include, but are not synonymous with, movements for peace or nonviolence. Indeed some antimilitarization movements are narrowly opposed to some but not all kinds of military activities, warfare, or weaponry (e.g., chemical warfare, torture, cluster munitions, nuclear weapons). The range of antimilitarization movements across time and place is immense. They include movements over millennia to stop wars; anticonscription movements; feminist movements against militarization; movements against military recruiting of youth or the use of child soldiers; movements against war crimes targeting women and other vulnerable groups; movements demanding reductions in military spending or the conversion of weapons manufacturing into civilian pro-
below will show, antibase movements have, at times, slowed, checked, and in some cases rolled back militarization at national, regional, and global levels. While military and civilian leaders have found ways to circumvent antibase movements, these movements, like other antimilitarization movements, have challenged militarization materially and ideologically.

**Antibase Movements**

It is important to explain what antibase movements are and what they are not: contrary to some popular portrayals, most movements challenging US bases overseas are not anti-American in the sense of being opposed to US citizens and all things from the United States. When the iconic phrase “Yankee go home” is used at protests, it almost always refers to US military personnel and not to all US citizens. In Vicenza, Italy, and elsewhere, for example, protesters often emphasize that their opposition is not motivated by anti-Americanism (e.g., Benjamin 2007).

Generally speaking, most antibase movements are also not antimilitary in the sense of being opposed to soldiers, armies, and all things military. While some movements and parts of movements self-identify as pacifist, nonviolent, or philosophically opposed to militaries, antibase movements often have a structural critique that views rank-and-file military personnel as victims of the same system that subjects people living near foreign bases to their negative effects (Davis 2011).

Antibase movements are not synonymous with antiterrorist movements, although the lines between the two often “become blurred” (Holmes 2014:26). In some cases, the term “antibase movement” is something of a misnomer when movements are not opposed to a base’s existence or calling for its closure. Many are asking for greater environmental protections, the reduction of aircraft noise, the return of land, or the accountability for crimes committed by troops. I use the term “antibase movement” because it is widely used by movement members and scholars and because such movements, strictly speaking, are “anti—" in the sense that they are opposed to some aspect of the life of a base or its personnel.5

Most movements have primarily employed forms of nonviolent protest. Some have employed violent tactics or force. These fall along a spectrum including breaching base fences, tampering with utilities and other base infrastructure, destruction of military property, rock throwing, pushing and low-level scuffles with local police, kidnappings, bombings, and other armed attacks.

Some explicitly militant movements, such as al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab, have declared the removal of a foreign military presence as a primary goal. The presence of US bases in the Muslim holy lands of Saudi Arabia was a major recruiting tool for al-Qaeda and part of Osama bin Laden’s professed motivation for the September 11, 2001, attacks (Glain 2011). In 2003, US forces officially withdrew from Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the 2001 attacks and the prior attacks dating to 1996. In Iraq, the removal of US and other occupation forces was the primary aim of the Islamic State’s predecessor organizations, Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad and al-Qaeda in Iraq (Mapping Militant Organizations 2017). In Somalia, al-Shabaab has grown into a major militant force in large part because it has organized opposition to Ethiopian, UN, African Union, and other occupying foreign forces (Mapping Militant Organizations 2016).

**A Short History of Foreign Bases**

Today, a small group of countries have foreign military bases: in addition to the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and Turkey each have a handful of extraterritorial bases. China, Japan, and a few other countries each have one. The United States currently maintains around 800 military bases6 outside the 50 states and Washington, DC, which means that the United States possesses around 90%–95% of the world’s foreign bases (Vine 2015). According to Pentagon figures (US Department of Defense 2018), most “base sites” are in Germany (194), Japan (121), South Korea (83), and Italy (44). Other bases for air, ground, and naval forces, as well as missile deployments, drones, communications, and other functions, are scattered around the globe in places such as Ascension Island, Australia, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Colombia, Kyrgyzstan, and Qatar, among others. In total, the US military now has bases in approximately 80 countries and territories (Vine 2015).

From the ancient empires of China, Egypt, and Rome to the European empires of Britain, France, and Spain, military bases have been a foundation for the control of foreign lands and foreign peoples (Gillem 2007:3; Harkavy 1989, 2007; Lutz 2009:7–8). The United States is no exception. While many scholars date the creation of the first US bases abroad to the

---

seizure of Guantánamo Bay during the 1898 Spanish-American War, more than 250 frontier forts helped enable the seizure of foreign, Native American territory across North America (Lutz 2009:10). After 1898, the United States built bases beyond its shores in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam, Cuba, and Hawaii. In the early twentieth century, the US military established scores more bases during frequent interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as in Europe during World War I. After temporary occupations, almost all these bases closed.

During World War II, the United States developed history’s first truly global network of bases. By war’s end, US bases were found from Trinidad and Brazil to Burma and India, Portugal, Iceland, Greenland, and the Northern Marianas. By 1945, the United States occupied more than 30,000 installations at more than 2,000 base sites globally (Blaker 1990:9, 23; Monthly Review editors 2002).

After the war, the military left about half these bases but maintained a “permanent institution” of bases abroad (Stambuk 1963:9). Never before were so many US troops stationed permanently overseas. Never before had a power built so many bases of such a size that they soon resembled fully fledged US towns on other people’s lands.

During the Cold War, the number of US bases abroad fluctuated. The base network expanded significantly to facilitate US-led wars in Korea and Southeast Asia and contracted after active combat ended. Regional base networks developed in Central America and the Middle East in the 1980s (Blaker 1990:32; Stambuk 1963:9).

The Soviet Union had a much smaller collection of foreign bases during the Cold War, along with the United Kingdom and France, which retained bases in their remaining colonies. Other than bases in Cuba and Syria, most Soviet installations were in Eastern Europe (Birchard 1991:48; Harkavy 1989, 2007). Like its US counterpart, the Soviet military was forced to close some foreign bases during the Cold War, including in Somalia and Egypt (Gerson 1991). As the Soviet Union dissolved, Soviet troops left foreign bases in Eastern Europe and Asia (although the Russian military remained in, or soon returned to, a small number of foreign bases in Syria and some former Soviet republics).

For its part, following the Cold War’s end, the US military vacated around 60% of its foreign bases (US Department of Defense 2004:5). Despite the quantitative reductions, the same basic basing infrastructure remained in place and soon began to expand again. After the start of the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military significantly expanded its base presence in the greater Middle East. It has also closed significant numbers of bases in Europe and consolidated forces at a smaller number of increasingly large bases in Japan and South Korea. Dozens of relatively small, secretive “lily pad” bases—implying a frog jumping toward its prey and used for special forces, drones, and training local troops—have appeared across parts of Africa, in central and eastern Europe, and in other regions that previously had little or no US military presence.

A History of Antibase Movements

There is good reason to believe that nearly everywhere across history where foreign bases have existed, they have generated anger, opposition, and protest of some kind. Foreign bases, by definition, “involve the presence of one nation’s military on another nation’s soil,” writes bases expert Kent Calder, and they “are almost invariably unpopular for that reason” (2007:9).

Other sources of antibase opposition are similarly unsurprising around the globe and across time: the displacement of locals from their lands; crimes committed by military personnel; traffic and training accidents causing death, injury, and property damage; sex work and red-light district bars aimed at military personnel outside bases’ gates; the support bases provide for dictators and undemocratic regimes; and environmental damage caused by everyday military operations (e.g., Enloe 2014; Gerson and Birchard 1991; Gillem 2007; Lutz 2009; Vine 2015; Yeo 2011).

Much as Okinawan activists do today, locals in Boston kept a running list of the robberies, murders, and rapes committed by British redcoats before the American Revolution (Rae 2012). The stationing of foreign troops in the 13 colonies was one of the abuses listed in the US Declaration of Independence: “He has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies without the consent of our legislatures,” and “quarter[ed] large bodies of armed troops.”

For decades following independence, US Army forts occupying Native Americans’ lands provoked anger and violent resistance across the continent. The US military faced opposition and an insurgency seeking independence almost immediately after seizing the Philippines in 1898 (Lutz 2009:34). Soon, Cuban leaders were protesting the terms of the 1903 lease that the US government imposed on its de facto colony for “complete jurisdiction and control” over 45 square miles of Guantánamo Bay (Lipman 2008:23–24; Schwab 2009). Throughout the early twentieth century, Latin American governments and peoples developed lasting antagonisms toward the United States as a result of US soldiers and marines occupying Latin American countries’ soil, often for years, following invasions in Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic.

Other anticolonial movements worldwide have often been antibase movements of a kind, with the presence of foreign troops and abuses committed by those troops frequently
Figure 2. Map of major bases closed or blocked and selected contemporary antibase movements, as of 2015 (Vine 2015).
inspiring anticolonial struggles. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the military occupation of colonized lands generated opposition and rebellion from British India (Gillem 2007:5) and French Indochina to Soviet-controlled Afghanistan. After World War I, French bases and the deliberate deployment of French African colonial soldiers in occupied Germany generated resentments that helped fuel the Nazi rise (Höhn 2002:89).

The Emergence of Contemporary Antibase Movements

Facing the conquest and occupation of foreign lands by Germany, Japan, and Italy, the United States framed World War II as an anticolonial struggle, pledging to assist with decolonization upon war’s end. The creation of the United Nations (UN) enshrined the decolonization process and rights to self-determination and self-government. Although many allied countries welcomed US troops to bases on their soil during the war, some, such as Iceland, began requesting the return of bases and the removal of US forces soon after the war’s conclusion (Holmes 2014). Many labor unions and left-wing political parties, especially in Europe and Latin America, generally opposed any foreign bases. For its part, the US military was eager to keep as many bases as possible worldwide and worked with mixed success to secure basing rights from Greenland to the Portuguese Azores to Ecuador’s Galapagos.

In 1955, US troops, along with Soviet and other foreign forces, were forced to withdraw from bases in Austria as part of the declaration of Austrian neutrality, which included a constitutional ban on foreign bases. As the decolonization movement gained momentum in the 1950s and 1960s, newly independent nations evicted the United States from a string of bases in former British and French colonies including Trinidad, Morocco, and later Libya. France, Britain, and other declining European empires were also forced to give up most of their overseas bases as a result of anticolonial wars, peaceful opposition, and no longer being able to afford bases and troops far from home (see Calder 2007:100–101). In 1966, the French government of Charles de Gaulle ended the occupation of French soil when de Gaulle ordered all US and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces to withdraw from at least 12 significant bases in France within a year, as part of the country’s withdrawal from the NATO command structure.

Where US bases remained during the Cold War, the relationship between the installations and citizens of countries where the bases were located was, as base expert Amy Holmes says, “inherently contradictory” (2014:6). Until World War II, foreign bases “existed almost exclusively in the context of formal empire,” imposed through the occupation of others’ lands (Calder 2007:8). Although the United States has been an empire occupying Native American lands with military bases since independence, its post–World War II collection of foreign bases has been distinguished by the fact that most national governments have, to one degree or another, consented to the country’s presence. With the exception of the occupation of Germany, Japan, Italy, and Austria, Cuba’s Guantánamo Bay, and US colonies and UN “trust territories” (i.e., temporary colonies), most foreign governments had effectively forfeited a state’s “monopoly on the legitimate use of force” by allowing US bases and troops on their territory (citing Weber, Holmes 2014:6). After US bases remained in Germany, Japan, and Italy following the end of their formal occupation, their governments also technically forfeited the monopoly on the use of violence. Importantly, however, this consent has come in a context of often gaping power disparities, where US officials have used US dominance, forms of political-economic coercion, and fears of the Soviet Union (at times, intentionally inflated) to ensure national governments consented to a US base presence.

Despite the popular reputation of the United States as the liberator in World War II and the protector in the Cold War, “opposition to the US military presence arose both when and where it was least expected” (Holmes 2014:11). Despite economic opportunities for locals in the form of on-base employment, contracting opportunities, and customers for local businesses, “opposition broadened over time as the contradiction of US bases abroad became impossible to ignore: even in the best of situations, in democratically ruled host countries, where “the host population may be fully enfranchised citizens,” says Holmes, “they are at the same time disenfranchised by the U.S. presence. They have virtually no say in what the United States does on their territory, U.S. officials are not elected, and only rarely are U.S. personnel tried in local courts for any crimes they may commit.” In other words, locals were “being subjected to a foreign military presence that operated outside the realm of democracy” (Holmes 2014:6).

In the nations conquered during the war, relations between the occupiers and the occupied were mixed. While the early years of occupation created fond memories for many Germans of GIs, Hershey bars, jazz, and big US cars (Höhn 2002), tensions and complaints quickly multiplied, especially around crimes and soldiers’ romantic and sexual relations with German women (Willoughby 2001). Although attitudes about US troops grew worse in the Vietnam War era, organized antibase movements have remained relatively small in Germany.

In Japan, two similar images of the United States predominated after the war: on the one hand, jazz, fashion, and other status items; on the other, GI crime, environmental pollution, and people dispossessed by bases (Wright 2017:134). In Okinawa, scattered protests broke out against land seizures and US occupation within months of the war’s end (Cooley 2008:147). Tensions burst into public consciousness across the whole of Japan in 1956 at Tachikawa Air Base in the Tokyo suburb of Sunagawa. The announcement that the Japanese government

9. While the economic benefits of foreign bases are often exaggerated, and while bases can actually be counterproductive to sustainable economic development (Vine 2015:277–297), they are one reason why some probase groups have also appeared in the post–World War II era (usually responding to a threat to a base’s existence).
would be expropriating local land to expand Tachikawa Air Base on behalf of the US Air Force led to years of large protests featuring “pitched battles” between protestors and Japanese police in “bloody Sunagawa” (Wright 2017:136). The protests “very nearly upended the US-Japan military relationship” and “threatened the heart of American military policy in East Asia” (Wright 2017:137, 136). US officials ultimately decided the expansion was more trouble than it was worth. After two decades of protest, the US Air Force moved its operations to nearby Yokota Air Base and transferred Tachikawa to the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (Wright 2017:136–137).

Inspired in part by Sunagawa, antibase sentiment intensified in Okinawa in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s amid a series of deadly accidents and crimes committed by GIs, the war in Vietnam, and missteps by heavy-handed US occupation officials (Cooley 2008:147–149; Vine 2015:261–268). In 1970, a spontaneous uprising broke out in Okinawa in response to two late-night traffic accidents involving US military personnel. On an island where protests are usually formal, orderly, and relatively quiet, the burning of around 80 military vehicles and three buildings on base reflected long-simmering tensions.

When the United States finally returned Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty in 1972, the military shifted more of its base presence from Japan’s main islands to what remains its poorest and most marginalized prefecture. US officials hoped to shield the military from the kinds of protests seen in places like Tokyo’s Sunagawa and in other big host cities. In Turkey, for example, US bases were the source of intense national controversy throughout the 1960s and 1970s, prompting protests that drew thousands, strikes by base employees, extremist bombings and kidnappings, and the withdrawal of US troops from all but two bases in 1975 (Cooley 2008; Holmes 2014). Elsewhere in these turbulent decades, the US military was forced to vacate bases in Taiwan, Ethiopia, and Iran, after the fall of the US-backed Shah.

Transnational Connections

During the 1980s, the deployment of US–nuclear-tipped cruise missiles in Europe gave birth to some of the Cold War’s largest and broadest antinuclear movements. Many of the movements were simultaneously antibase movements calling for the removal of nuclear weapons and base closure. (Antinuclear movements in the Pacific and Indian Oceans were likewise sparked by the use of island nuclear test sites in the former and the development of the nuclear-capable US base on British-controlled Diego Garcia in the latter.)

The most prominent movement in Europe and internationally was likely the permanent “Women’s Peace Camp” at the US base in Greenham Common, England. Starting in 1981, women regularly blocked the base’s gates, slowed military operations, and cut through the fence line to interrupt military exercises. In December 1982, approximately 30,000 women came to Greenham Common to link hands around the base’s perimeter (Laware 2004). The following spring, 70,000 people created a 14-mile human chain linking the base to British nuclear weapons labs in Burghfield and Aldermaston. In late 1983, 50,000 women brought down part of the fence (Lortie 2000).

The women’s camp survived numerous eviction efforts by British officials and outlived both the removal of the cruise missiles near the Cold War’s end and the departure of US forces in 1993. The peace camp closed in September 2000 amid preparations to transform the base into a public park, business center, and arts complex (Laware 2004). The Greenham women’s occupation became a model and icon for feminists and other peace and antibase activists worldwide. The camp inspired similar protests and occupations at Comiso, Italy; Pine Gap, Australia; and outside the Seneca Falls army depot in New York (Krasniewicz 1992). Antibase movements have continued to employ permanent occupation encampments as a central protest tactic from Okinawa to Jeju to Vicenza.

Antibase Movements after the Cold War

As the Cold War was coming to an end, other bases started coming under pressure: for example, movements in Madrid, Rota, and Zaragoza helped push Spain’s government to negotiate for the withdrawal of US forces from the Torrejón suburb of Madrid and Zaragoza (Yeo 2011:186). The removal of Soviet bases and troops from Afghanistan, Mongolia, the former East Germany, and Eastern Europe inspired activists (Gerson 1991:27) and “provided an open door” to call for the closure of US bases in their countries (Yeo 2009:573).

Within a few months of the official dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, US troops had withdrawn from the Philippines. By 1999, the military was forced to vacate its bases in Panama as part of the termination of the Panama Canal Zone Treaty. In 2003, movements in both Hawai’i and Vieques, which have also had colonial or neocolonial relationships with the United States since the late nineteenth century, succeeded in removing US bases after decades of struggle. Hawai’ian activists, backed by powerful Senator Daniel Inouye, convinced the US Navy to leave Koho’olawe Island, home to important sacred sites for indigenous Hawai’ians. On Puerto Rico’s Vieques island, a decades-old movement of peaceful civil disobedience gained unprecedented national attention after the death of a security guard in a bombing range accident. Longtime activists and powerful New York City-based politicians willing to be arrested together pressured the US Navy to leave a bombing range that had decimated Vieques’s environment since World War II (McCaffrey 2002, 2006).

Since 1995, Okinawa has been home to the most controversial US base presence and the antibase movement that has...
consistently generated the most international attention. Despite the power of the movement, the results of the protests in Okinawa have been mixed: the most controversial base, Futenma, which the overwhelming majority of Okinawans want removed, remains operational. The replacement base that the Japanese government has promised to build has spawned its own antibase movement. The US military’s promise to move around 9,000 marines off Okinawa to Guam and other Pacific bases by 2014 has been put off by at least a decade. Between the 1995 rape and 2011, alone, there were reports of at least 23 more rapes and sexual assaults committed by US personnel (Okinawa Women Act against Military Violence 2011:23–25).

Despite years of protest, the status quo has changed little since 1995. In contrast, the US military has returned thousands of acres of land from other bases in Okinawa since 1995, while years of around-the-clock protest has blocked construction of the Futenma replacement base. Maintaining the status quo has also required a great deal of work and financial capital by the Japanese government: to try to appease Okinawans, Tokyo officials have spent billions paying rent to base landowners and building often-unnecessary infrastructure projects, which generally benefit large Tokyo-based construction companies (Cooley 2008:143, 158–159). The Japanese government has also started paying for a significant part of the multibillion-dollar bill to move the marines and build up bases in Guam. As Okinawa illustrates, assessing the success or failure of movements is rarely simple.

Iraq War–Era Movements

Following the 2003 US-led war in Iraq, antibase movements grew in size and strength. Global support for the United States following the attacks of September 11, 2001, had eroded rapidly as millions protested worldwide in 2002 and 2003 to stop the war of US President George W. Bush’s administration. Internationally, tens of thousands of people joined major international human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International, in a campaign to close the prison at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, while condemning torture there and at Iraq’s Abu Ghraib military prison (a kind of base).

Meanwhile, vibrant movements against US bases emerged in places where antibase protest was little known. Guam, for example, is known for having some of the highest military enlistment rates in the United States. And yet a movement led mostly by young indigenous Chamorro activists has succeeded in forcing the Pentagon to revise its multibillion dollar buildup plans to move marines from Okinawa. Despite promises about the economic benefits of the buildup, We Are Guåhan (the indigenous Chamorro name for the island) pointed out the dangers of the planned population boom on an island with an already strained infrastructure (Harden 2010:A1, A7; Natividad and Kirk 2010). Collaborating in a lawsuit with the National Trust for Historic Preservation, We Are Guåhan forced the Marines to move the location of a planned shooting range that would have sat atop the remains of a sacred indigenous village and burial ground dating to at least 900 CE. In 2017, Guam’s governor announced his opposition to the buildup.

The city of Vicenza has long been another supportive base host in Italy’s wealthy and strongly conservative northeast. Plans to build a new base at Vicenza’s Dal Molin Airport unexpectedly provoked a surge of protest. Opposition came from an unusually diverse mix of self-identified housewives and businessmen, former 1960s radicals and young anarchists, university students, religious organizations, and pacifists, and disaffected members of the racist, anti-immigrant Northern League party.

The “No Dal Molin” movement gained national and international attention, drawing 50,000–120,000 people to the largest of its protests in a city of just 115,000. Despite the optimism, the base opened in 2013. Still, the movement saved about half of the land originally slated for the base. The mayor declared it a peace park. Many activists were pains by the irony of the name. They are divided about whether this should be considered a partial victory (Vine 2015:292–293).

In South Korea, members of a similar type of movement blocked traffic, put their bodies in front of construction trucks, endured violent treatment by police, and created a years-long permanent encampment to stop the creation of a Korean naval installation on the island of Jeju. Locals, other Korean activists, and international supporters including Gloria Steinem and Noam Chomsky feared the base would destroy a delicate and rare volcanic beachfront, damage farmland and the local community, and contribute to rising military tensions with China. Many suspect the new base is really a US installation (Müller 2011; Ahn 2011). Like Vicenza, the movement ultimately failed to stop the base, which recently became operational.

Elsewhere in South Korea, support for US troops, long credited with protecting the South from communist invasion, had been shaken since an armored vehicle killed two teenage girls during a training exercise in 2002. The country’s largest ever antibase protests followed.

Before the decade was out, hundreds of local villagers and Koreans and some international supporters tried and failed to stop the South Korean government from seizing 2,851 acres of farmers’ land as part of the Bush administration’s US$11 billion expansion of Camp Humphreys. The South Korean government used riot police and soldiers to enforce the evictions.

A Global “No Bases” Movement

An international antibases movement was born in the wake of the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq. In response to the perceived “defeat”12 of the global antiwar movement due to its inability to stop the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a group of antibase activists in the antiwar movement started highlighting the connections between bases and war, while connecting anti-
While activists and movements had periodic cross-national contact in the past, there was no unified global antibases movement before 2003. After the end of the Cold War, antibase activists increasingly had begun to share tactics and ideas (Yeo 2009:576), especially given the success in the Philippines. The growing global justice movement, following feminist and anti-nuclear movements, helped antibase activists realize the value of building a unified global movement (Yeo 2009:177, 181).

Two months after the 2003 Iraq invasion, activists created a global campaign to “map, expose, and counter the global military presence of the United States and others who enabled this and other invasions” (van der Zeijden 2010:107). Over the next several years, activists built an international network, mostly through online relationships and a series of World Social Forums and other meetings and conferences from India to Brazil. According to the network’s coordinator, the movement came to include more than 400 organizations (van der Zeijden 2010:106).13


Around 2010, the international network ceased operating formally after funding for the international coordinator’s salary expired (van der Zeijden 2010:109).15 Many activists have since maintained their transnational connections, while focusing on regional subnetworks of movements (Davis 2017b:164; van der Zeijden 2010:109).

Despite its disappearance, the international network appears to have “played an important role” by encouraging Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa to fulfill his promise not to renew the lease on the US base in Manta (Yeo 2011:180). In explaining his decision, President Correa told reporters he would renew the lease on one condition: “They let us put a base in Miami—an Ecuadorian base” (Stewart 2007).

13. The combination of three broad antibase critiques helped unify activists internationally: activists coalesced around combating foreign bases because of (1) their role in enabling wars, (2) their antidemocratic violation of local sovereignty, and (3) the damage and harm they inflict on neighboring locals (Davis 2017b; Yeo 2009:573–575, 2011:199). The network also proved flexible enough to include movements and activists who would not or could not publicly subscribe to all three critiques. Far from the not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) caricature imposed on many antibase movements by some base supporters, the No Bases network sought to build “a transnational ‘not in anyone’s backyard’ movement” (Yeo 2011:200).

14. The Quito Declaration continued, “Foreign military bases and all other infrastructure used for wars of aggression violate human rights . . . are instruments of war that entrench militarization, colonialism, imperial policy, patriarchy, and racism.”

15. Funding came from the Transnational Institute, a Netherlands-based leftist think tank.

The No Bases movement likely deserves at least some credit for at least two other successes: first, when every government in Africa refused to host the headquarters for the newly created US Africa Command in 2007, and second, the Iraqi Parliament’s 2011 decision to reject a Pentagon request to maintain as many as 58 enduring bases in Iraq after the end of the official US occupation.

The Significance of Antibase Movements

Assessing the significance of the global No Bases movement or any individual movement is difficult. Numerous cases show that foreign bases can become major national political issues and shape domestic politics, as in the Philippines, Japan, Italy, Germany, South Korea, Ecuador, Colombia, and Turkey. In some cases, such as in Okinawa (Davis 2011; McCormack and Norimatsu 2012; Vine 2015:277–297; Yeo 2011) and Vicenza (Lanaro 2010; Vine 2015:255–275; Yeo 2011), national governments have fallen in no small part because of their stances on basing issues. Generally, foreign bases only enter into domestic political debate because of social movement activism.

The antibase movement in Sunagawa, Japan, is an example of how a movement can also have “fantastically wide ripples” of social and ideological impact across generations (Wright 2017:137). According to Wright, the “Sunagawa Struggle” became “central to the social history of a nation.” The thinking of lawyers, scholars, activists, and others has been shaped to this day by the iconic protests and a related lawsuit challenging the legality of hosting US bases given the Japanese constitution’s commitment to peace and a nonoffensive military (Wright 2017).16

Movements have also clearly influenced and inspired one another through the international network and regional and movement-to-movement relationships (e.g., Davis 2017b; Yeo 2009). Visits by members of antibase movements to other antibase movements, in particular, have helped disseminate tactics, educate international audiences about local struggles, and protect local protesters from police (Davis 2017b:166–168; Lanaro 2010; Wright 2017).

Visits to other movements, according to activists in South Korea, Okinawa, Puerto Rico, Hawai’i, and Guam, also led to “personal transformations” based on “lasting bonds of solidarity” and the development of a new “critical consciousness” involving an ability to “put their own militarization in context” (Davis 2017b:165–166, 2017a:114–115). As a result of visits, Davis writes (and as I heard in my research), activists “felt less alone in their struggles and more likely to take part in bolder protest actions” (Davis 2017a:114).

Movements have also shaped activists’ identities, provided an outlet for creativity and self- and group-expression, and
improved daily life (e.g., Davis 2011:223, 2017b:163–164; Yeo 2009:575, 2011:198–199). Antibase movements are important if for no other reason than that they “give voice to local residents who would otherwise suffer in silence” (Yeo 2011:198–199). Resistance “makes everyday life more tolerable,” Davis notes, while also having “repercussions at other scales” (Davis 2011:223).

Impacts on Basing Strategy and Military Operations

While the effects of antibase movements on national, local, and individual scales are important, movements’ ability to achieve their stated aims—of closing or blocking a base or restricting base operations—is the fundamental question. Scholars have reached no clear consensus about the relative power of movements in basing debates, although scholars’ findings are not necessarily inconsistent. Cooley (2008) generally treats movements as marginal players in “base politics.” Instead, Cooley argues, the most important factors determining whether US bases abroad close or not are the type of regime controlling a host nation government and shifts from one regime to another. Kawato likewise concludes that movements “have limited influence on policy-makers.” On the other hand, Kawato acknowledges that protesters must be part of any analysis, given findings that antibase movements were able to sway policy makers’ basing decisions in five of 12 cases from Okinawa, the Philippines, and South Korea (2015:6).

Like Kawato, others take something of a middle ground: Calder (2007) argues that antibase protest plays a significant role in basing politics but that national politics, government regime shifts, and historical, demographic, and geographic factors are more important in determining outcomes. Yeo (2011, 2017) finds that antibase movements are but one factor in basing politics, “although, at times, they exert a powerful impact on base policy decisions” (2011:196). According to Yeo, host nation elites and their existing security consensus about national security policy are the most important factor determining the outcome of debates about US bases. On the other hand, when powerful antibase movements have created national debates over basing policy, “host governments occasionally provided limited concessions in an effort to quell protests.” However, Yeo writes, concessions tend to be superficial and come most often when there is a weak elite security consensus. In most cases “a dominant elite consensus favoring a U.S. force presence and strong ties to the United States functioned as a powerful ideological barrier against antibase movements” (Yeo 2011:179).

By contrast, Sebastian Bitar found that movements in Latin America had more power to influence basing decisions. Since the late 1990s, when increased democratization spread through the region, “Latin American domestic opposition groups,” as well as the courts and national constitutions, have become “important mechanisms to block the establishment [and maintenance] of formal US bases” (Bitar 2016:176).

Like Bitar, Amy Holmes (2014) found that antibase movements in Turkey and Germany posed a significant challenge to the US military, increasing civilian oversight and decreasing the military’s autonomy. Challenging Yeo’s conclusions, Holmes writes that on the one hand, “protest activities were catalysts for changing the level of elite consensus within the host government,” thus influencing basing outcomes. On the other hand, host nation elites were not always determinants: “certain protest activities had a direct impact on the U.S. military presence, and essentially circumvented host-nation elites. . . . At times, U.S. military officials were forced to respond to certain types of unrest and accept restrictions on their ability to operate” (Homes 2014:14, emphasis in original).

Rather than defining success as whether a base stays or goes, Holmes usefully counters that a base remaining in place “does not necessarily represent a complete failure” (Holmes 2014:28; see also Yeo 2011:198–199). Holmes identifies at least six other kinds of movement success, defined as the ability to “limit the autonomy of the military” or otherwise disrupt its regular operations (Holmes 2014:29, 30). Success includes:

1. “creating access restrictions or temporary access denials to either territory, airspace, or certain [military] facilities”;
2. “disrupting access to infrastructure [e.g., utilities]”;
3. “implementing or enforcing environmental standards that make certain military activities too costly or difficult to conduct, [thus] preventing military expansion or construction projects”;
4. “shutting down base operations through strikes of civilian base employees”;
5. “creating shortages by refusing to supply the base with goods and services”; and

Yeo’s findings echo Holmes’ sixth form of success and identify another:

7. forcing the United States and a host government “to modify existing base plans” (2011:198–199).

Clear Impact: Changing Military Geography

The clearest indication of the impact of antibase movements is found in the US military’s reaction to antibase opposition. Since early in the post–World War II era, US military and civilian planners have shaped the geography of the global base network because of their fears of the kinds of protest that have led to losing access to bases abroad (Vine 2009). This has resulted in a marked preference for bases in countries ruled by dictators and other undemocratic regimes. From the perspective of US policy makers, Calder explains, dictatorships are preferable to democracies because “base politics operate most smoothly when the mass public is not involved” (2007:116–117). For decades, the fear of antibase protest has also resulted...
in a geographic shift: the general movement of bases from populated urban areas to isolated sites insulated from any significant opposition.

This shift has come to fruition most visibly in the lily pad basing strategy, which emerged around the turn of the century. Under this strategy, the Pentagon has been creating small, secretive bases far from population centers and potentially antagonistic locals. The military’s aim has been to acquire a collection of dozens of easily expandable lily pad bases in places with little or no US military presence (Vine 2015:299–319).

“The presence and activities of our forces grate on local populations and have become an irritant for host governments,” former George W. Bush administration Pentagon Secretary Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged (Brown 2006:28). “Wherever possible,” the administration aimed to move bases and troops to “lessen the real and perceived burdens of such situations” (US Department of Defense 2004:7).

In other words, the military is well aware of what officials see as the “problem” of antibase movements and is “taking measures to address it” (Davis 2011:219). In addition to creating lily pads, US officials have responded to antibase organizing by further segregating US forces from locals at a consolidated number of very large, increasingly insular bases to avoid the crimes, accidents, and other tensions that have fueled protest movements.

The motivation for these changes is not generally protecting the well-being of locals; instead, it is “the quest for operational unilaterlalism.” Military leaders want to be able “to strike quickly without any need for consultation with anyone, even the government of the territory from which they are launching the strike” (Davis 2011:220). The military has been particularly focused on overcoming antibase resistance by moving operations to locations where inhabitants possess fewer democratic rights, offering the military “greater freedom to operate” (Davis 2011:216). Major buildups have taken place in two of the remaining US and UK colonies, Guam and Diego Garcia; in Africa and Central and Eastern Europe there are now dozens of “lily pads” (Vine 2015:299–313).

Amid a major buildup on Guam, Major General Dennis Larsen told a reporter, “This is not Okinawa,” clearly referencing its antibase opposition. “This is American soil in the midst of the Pacific. Guam is a US territory. We can do what we want here, and make huge investments without fear of being thrown out” (Kaplan 2008:60–61). In the shift of bases and forces to locations like Guam, one sees how the geography of the US military base network has been “shaped not only by global military priorities, but also by an increasingly globalized network of local social movements resisting militarization” (Davis 2011:215).

Why Are Some Antibase Movements More Successful than Others?

Examining the history of antibase movements around the globe in the post–World War II era, it is difficult to offer a general theory about why some movements are more successful than others in achieving their stated aims. The context surrounding each movement involves hundreds of variables that shape a movement’s outcome. Even in a single case, understanding causality and what factors or actors were most influential is difficult because of the secrecy surrounding foreign bases and foreign base negotiations. It is especially difficult because foreign bases are embedded in larger national, regional, and global political-economic and military relations, and in government, corporate, and elite interests. Far from just a debate about security or military strategy, movements face situations in which bases are linked to broad nation-to-nation trade relations, specific nation-to-nation economic deals, military weapons sales, and diplomatic relationships including support at the UN and other international forums, among other geopolitical-economic relations (Vine 2015:195–251). To cite just one example, some suspect that successive Italian governments supported the creation of a new base in Vicenza, Italy, owing to the US government’s inclusion of Italian weapons manufacturers in lucrative weapons contracts, such as for the F-35 joint strike fighter.

Bases scholars have theorized on the basis of a restricted number of antibase cases. To theorize across anything approaching the full universe of cases would require at least a book-length work and a level of detailed knowledge about each case, which suggests a team of researchers might best advance such a theory.17

Acknowledging the challenges—and perhaps folly—of theorizing across so many cases, over so much time, and in so many contexts around the globe, I offer the following tentative conclusions:

1. Antibase movements face a complex and heavily imbalanced power struggle involving an array of local, national, and international actors; the interactions among these actors determine movement outcomes. Although local dynamics vary, movements have often been opposed by forces including the foreign basing power; a movement’s own national government; local and regional governments; transnational, national, and local corporations and elites; base employees; and others benefiting from or otherwise supportive of a base presence (fig. 3).

2. Decisions about bases are rarely, if ever, made strictly on the basis of military strategy or security considerations alone. Economic and political interests connected to bases—domestically, regionally, internationally—figure prominently in the decisions of national policy makers (e.g., Calder 2007; Cooley 2008; Kawato 2015). Yeo’s thesis (2011) that the “security consensus” among na-
tional elites usually determines the outcome of basing debates raises the question of why such security consensuses exist, how they are created, and what economic and political interests shape them.

3. That basing decisions are tied to so many government, corporate, and elite economic and political interests makes the challenge of closing or blocking bases especially difficult for movements.

4. Closing or blocking bases almost always requires an antibase movement’s national government or powerful politicians to demand such an outcome of the US government. Movements rarely convince or force the US military to succumb to their demands without such support. Prominent exceptions include Guam and Colombia, where lawsuits helped movements achieve at least some of their aims.

5. Because antibase movements almost always need national politicians on their side to achieve their stated goals, the primary target of antibase activism is usually best a national government rather than the US military. Secondarily targeting the US military can be helpful in restricting usage, inflicting greater operating costs, and putting indirect pressure on a national government when the US military expresses dissatisfaction about operational constraints inflicted by a movement.

6. The central challenge for movements seeking to close bases is generally one of convincing national politicians and decision-makers that the cost of maintaining the base status quo is greater than any benefits received from the status quo, or that the political and at times economic benefits of closing or blocking a base outweigh the political and economic benefits of the status quo and any costs potentially inflicted by the US government or local corporate and elite actors as punishment for closure.

7. Dedicated antibase movements almost always win at least some concessions from the US military, even if the concessions are just restrictions on daily military operations that lessen a base’s impact on locals. This is because of the military’s desire to avoid and quickly quell protest and because national governments, in most cases, have at least some power to demand changes from the US military. Indeed, the ability of a government such as Djibouti’s to extract greater rent from the US government for basing rights suggests that some host governments may have more power than their officials realize.

Conclusion

This article has shown that, despite significant power differentials between movements and the foreign basing power,
social movements, as well as host nation governments, have restricted the operation of foreign bases, blocked new base construction, and evicted bases—and that they can do so again. While militarization often seems to be an unstoppable, self-perpetuating force, antibase movements are an example of an antimilitarization movement that has, at times, slowed, stopped, and reversed militarization as a material and ideological process. Specifically, antibase movements have disrupted militarization materially not just by closing and blocking bases but also by forcing military personnel to spend more time, energy, and resources responding to movements—time, energy, and resources that would otherwise go to war fighting and preparations for war. In this way, antibase movements are also a sign of centuries-long democratizing trends that have made bases and empires like the United States subject to greater opposition and democratic control. Like anticolonial movements, antibase movements are, in various ways, challenging the loss of sovereignty and demanding the restoration of democratic decision-making over occupied land. At a broader level, antibase movements have disrupted militarization ideologically by challenging the belief that military officials hold a monopoly on knowledge about military policy and that they should control all military decisions (Davis 2011:223).

This is not to say that challenging foreign bases is easy. After 50 years, the Chagossian people exiled during construction of the US military base on Diego Garcia are still living in exile and struggling to return home. Despite nearly a decade of unprecedented social movement struggle and international attention in both Vicenza, Italy, and Jeju, South Korea, new bases were built, leaving locals with few tangible victories to show for their efforts.

Even when movements have won clear victories, the results are not always as unambiguously positive as they may seem. In Vieques, the environmental clean-up of the former Navy testing area is still not complete 15 years after the Navy’s departure. One year after being pushed out of Vieques, the Navy closed its major base in Puerto Rico, Roosevelt Roads. Many interpreted this as a way to punish Puerto Ricans, and the closure has surely inflicted economic and social pain on base employees and others whose livelihoods depended on the base. After Ecuador evicted the United States, the US government maintained some military ties in the country and created a “quasi base” there (Bitar 2016). Across Latin America, the military has responded to evictions in Panama, Ecuador, and Colombia by circumventing social movement protest and democratic oversight with informal government-to-government agreements for quasi bases throughout the region (Bitar 2016:43).

The return of US troops and bases to the Philippines is the most powerful cautionary tale. Within a few years of the military’s departure, US negotiators in 1996 signed a “visiting forces agreement” with the Philippines that allowed US troops back into the country for military exercises and training. By 2003, the US military was participating in 18 exercises a year. Soon, there were more than 30 annually. By 2008, there were 6,000 US troops involved in a single exercise—three times the number of Filipinos (Docena 2012; Jane’s Security Sentinel 2009). The exercises had become a way to hide the near-permanent deployment of large numbers of US troops involved in counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines’ south (Kaplan 2008:315). As many as 600 US Special Forces troops were operating from as many as seven lily pad bases despite the Philippines’ constitutional ban on foreign bases (Kaplan 2005:131–184). US troops now have access to Filipino airspace, airfields, sea lanes, harbors, and even the former US bases at Subic Bay and Clark. A 2014 agreement allows an even larger US presence. Both governments insist the agreement will respect Filipino sovereignty and create no US “bases” (Fonbuena 2014).

The US military now has “everything—and arguably more—than it had” before 1992, according to Herbert Docena. Only now, it has this presence “without the economic and political costs of maintaining large garrison-like bases that can serve as visible symbols for the opposition” (Docena 2012).

Despite these trends, in the Philippines and elsewhere, it is often too soon to determine a movement’s success or failure. Around the world, it is surely too early, and simplistic, to determine the success or failure of a movement by its ability or inability to remove or block a base alone. Many antibase movements that removed or blocked bases took decades to win those victories, with years of apparent failure.

“The US military can have its operations limited anywhere,” Davis points out. “There was a time when it was difficult to imagine that protest movements in Vieques, Hawaii and Okinawa would become effective at altering military operations” (Davis 2011:223). But even after movements achieve victories, the Philippines and other cases show that the work of demilitarization is far from done.

Acknowledgments

I am deeply grateful for the help and insights provided by many people connected to antibase movements I met during my research. Thank you also to Catherine Besteman and Hugh Gusterson, Clare Bayard, Patricia Cogley, Joseph Gerson, Catherine Lutz, Laurie Obbink, Mark Ropelewski, Wilbert van der Zeijden, Chagos Refugees Group, two anonymous reviewers, friends who offered advice about figure 3, and many others who assisted with my research and writing. I received some research support from American University and the Fund for Constitutional Government.