In this paper, we explore linkages between electoral politics and judicial voting behavior in the context of models that take into account personal, contextual, institutional, and case-related influences on courts. Using probit (ordered and binary), we examine the votes cast in death penalty decisions by supreme court justices in eight American states from 1983 through 1988 We anticipate and find evidence that institutional features are prominent in shaping the distribution of institutional preferences Fundamentally, justices have predispositions that are consistent with the states' electoral and ideological environments Moreover, these institutional arrangements subsequently enhance or restrict opportunities for individual members, once selected, to exhibit their predispositions Personal preferences notwithstanding, individual justices' support for the death penalty is affected by competitive electoral conditions and institutional arrangements that create linkages with the political environment Finally, when we control for the effects of personal, contextual, and institutional features, case-specific variables emerge as critical determinants of the judicial vote.