EthicsVolume 130, Number 2 Previous articleNext article No AccessDiscussionsNormative Reasons without (Good) Reasoning*Artūrs LoginsArtūrs Logins Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSAbstractFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookXLinkedInRedditBlueskyEmailPrint SectionsMoreAbstract According to the good reasoning view of normative reasons, p is a reason to F, just in case p is a premise of a good pattern of reasoning. This article presents two counterexamples to the most promising version of the good reasoning view.DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 130, Number 2January 2020 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/705765 PermissionsRequest permissions Views: 457Total views on this site Citations: 7Citations are reported from Crossref © 2020 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Samuel Asarnow Reasons Last, 98 (Feb 2025).https://doi.org/10.1093/9780197633878.001.0001Ulf Hlobil Explaining Deontic Status by Good Reasoning, Erkenntnis 1 (Sep 2024).https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-024-00860-1Artūrs Logins Inquiry and reasons, Synthese 204, no.22 (Jul 2024).https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04687-9Artūrs Logins How to argue with a pragmatist, Inquiry 67, no.11 (May 2021): 384–399.https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1919199Christian Kietzmann Why reasons and reasoning don’t come apart, Synthese 202, no.55 (Nov 2023).https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04355-4John Brunero Reasons and Defeasible Reasoning, The Philosophical Quarterly 72, no.11 (Apr 2021): 41–64.https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqab013Hans-Johann Glock, Eva Schmidt Pluralism about practical reasons and reason explanations, Philosophical Explorations 24, no.22 (Apr 2021): 119–136.https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2021.1908578
