regards the natural order of human wants, and seeks the merely pleasurable above what is necessary and salutary, if it serves pride and wantonness and causes a neglect of the welfare of others.

After discussing the opinions of ancient and modern writers on luxury, the author speaks of luxury in modes of living, in eating and drinking, in decoration and dress, in dwelling, etc., and then of the luxury of intellectual and social pleasures.

G. v. G.

**ENGLISH COLONIZATION AND EMPIRE.** By Alfred Caldecott, M.A. London: Murray, 1891.

This is a volume of the "University Extension Manuals," edited by Professor Knight. The book is of course mainly historical, but it is a history written by one who is also a student of ethics. The ethical tone of it may be indicated by an extract with reference to the treatment of barbarous peoples by the English. "Looking back," says Mr. Caldecott, "over this whole history it does not appear satisfactory to our ideas of morality and humanity, to say nothing of Christian charity, for us to seek palliation or justification for our treatment of these nature-peoples, especially in America and Australia, by referring to the necessity for the survival of the fittest in the struggle for life. Man, as a spiritual being, cannot be judged by reference to the laws of the non-spiritual sphere of being. And that the spiritual principles of justice, kindness, and human brotherliness would have yielded different results is (1) certain on abstract principles, and (2) confirmed by many isolated instances, notably the brightest spot in all the history, the method of Penn and the Colonists of Pennsylvania, and (3) ratified by the comparative success in this century since higher principles have been both invoked and made effective. Where justice and charity have been combined, where courtesy and trust have been our weapons, even with high-spirited peoples, response has not been lacking on their part. The past is irrevocable, and in the future men must move on. Some of these peoples are plainly passing away: they are unable to live when called upon to make a sudden and almost a spasmodic effort to live in a higher stage of culture. But even for them it is not difficult to determine what should be our attitude. What is our conduct to the sick and dying among ourselves? all the alleviations and comforts we can think of are placed cheerfully at their disposal. Let it be so for these sick and dying tribes. Let us work gently as in the sick-chamber, and be ministers to their closing years in comfort, patience, and tenderness." This last remark seems to suggest a somewhat treacherous analogy. The book (as a whole) seems well adapted for its purpose, and will be of distinct interest to students of the philosophy of history.

J. S. M.


Dr. Ch. Letourneau, professor in the School of Anthropology in Paris, attempts in his former works: "The Evolution of Morality" (1887), "The Evolution of Marriage and the Family" (1888), "The Evolution of Property" (1889),
“Political Evolution in the various Human Races” (1890), and in his recent book, “Juridical Evolution,” to reconstruct the scale of the moral development of mankind. For this purpose he utilizes the rich material of anthropological and sociological facts known at the present time, brings together and interprets the laws, institutions, customs, etc., of the various human races, beginning with the lowest, and does not omit at the end to rapidly forecast the moral future of man. In his last work the author first points out (chap. i.) “the origins of right,” demonstrating its biological root, and describing its embryonic development. In the second chapter he sets forth the most rudimentary forms of right (“justice among republican tribes”). In the six following chapters he describes justice in the different monarchies (monarchical tribes, barbaric monarchies, large and small; justice in China).

The author next analyzes justice among the Bereric races (chap. ix.), among the Arabs (chap. x.), Hebraic justice (chap. xi.), justice in India and Persia (chap. xii.), justice in Greece (chap. xiii.), in ancient Rome (chaps. xiv., xv.), among the barbarous Aryans (chap. xvi.), then justice among the Germans (chap. xvii.), and, finally, feudal justice (chap. xviii.).

In the last chapter the author draws the conclusion which naturally follows the facts he has given: “The very imperfect sense of justice, actually prevailing to-day in the brains of most of those who have but little culture, is only a result of the life of their ancestors, a slow and painful acquisition, a psychical transformation, an idealization of the need of vengeance.” (P. 488.)

This need manifested itself at first with continual regularity, in the form of retaliation, then in that of pecuniary compensation, which was given first to the injured person, then to the chief, the state. This last form of compensation did away with the primitive desire for vengeance, the individual having no longer any hope for material advantages for himself. When the state charged itself with the prosecution of crimes, the idea of abstract impersonal justice began to take shape in the minds of men. Henceforth it was organized society itself which took revenge, and not the injured individual.

The punishment of criminals is still to-day looked upon as social revenge. “Our tribunals,” the author truly remarks, “have not ceased to regard themselves as more or less charged with a mission of revenge; our courts are still inspired by a vague sentiment of legal wrath, a feeble echo of the ancient talion of primitive races.” But juridical evolution will not stop at this phase. The author foresees the time when the courts will no longer punish. “They will only do the work of social preservation and, if possible, of education.” (P. 511.) The great importance and unquestionable usefulness of this book and of the works of Dr. Letourneau in general, consist in the abundance of historical and sociological material, in the enormous accumulation of facts which support the author's assertions and conclusions. His patient collection and judicious co-ordination of evidences will undoubtedly render a great service in the construction of ethical science. And, looked at from an ethical point of view, a more exact knowledge of the past morals of mankind will greatly increase faith in the possibility of attaining, in the future, a moral ideal that will be purer and more elevated than that which prevails at present. It is in this way that the ethical movement which comes to us from America—the great culture movement of
our time—will be able to explain in history its actual success and the hope of its future victory.

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This work, as the general editor of the "Philosophical Library" points out, is not a translation in the ordinary sense. It was specially written for the series to which it belongs, and was produced first in English dress from the author's manuscript, under the most careful supervision. Naturally, in these circumstances, the highest expectations regarding it were raised, not only among philosophical students, but also in theological circles. Perhaps those anticipations were too high; certain it is they cannot be said to have been completely realized. Not that a scholar of Dr. Pfleiderer's power and skill has produced a work unworthy of his reputation. But, since his "Religionsphilosophie," we judge him by a standard which could be applied to few others. The expectation had been for a final work on this momentous period in the evolution of religious thought,—final, that is, for the present generation,—even although it was remarked that an absolutely final judgment could not yet be pronounced, the movement being still in progress. Taken as a whole, the book is partly satisfactory, partly unsatisfactory. In its wide learning and critical penetration, as in its luminous treatment of certain writers, it cannot soon be surpassed. The easy mastery with which our author threads his way among the tangled mazes of German theological thought is impressive, more especially in the Third Book, where Dr. Pfleiderer is on his own chosen ground of "Biblical and Historical Theology." His acute critical penetration, again, is seen in his criticism of Hegel, and in his fine appreciation of Schleiermacher's true historical position. Here, indeed, he is expounding once more his own relationship to those two writers. The explanation of the historical influence which ought to be accorded to the Glaubenslehre is admirable; it is not only of the highest interest, it is also thoroughly fair. The essential ethical element in religion here receives just the kind of recognition which we should have expected from the author of the clear monograph, "Religion und Moral." And we can only express disappointment that Dr. Pfleiderer did not continue the treatment here accorded to Schleiermacher in other cases. He has too frequently forgotten that the truest theologians must, in the first place, possess religious affinities. He often tends to set the head in authority over the heart, and thus to mistake, or rather to minimize, those with whom he is not in agreement. A current of this kind can, for example, be detected in his treatment of Christian von Hofmann (pp. 173-177). But once more, on the other side, his account of thinkers with whom he sympathizes is often admirable. A. E. Biedermann (pp. 137-145) is fully and fairly appreciated; so too, though in a lesser degree, is F. C. Baur; and Vatke also receives the recognition, which too few have been willing to accord him, even although, strangely enough, it is granted only within the limits of critical theology. In the English section, further, Maurice, T. H. Green, and Dr. John Caird receive just attention. The