ought to be specially mentioned on p. 635. "Laws of Thought" is just the kind of article which a dictionary of this kind ought not to have. It is a somewhat peculiar and personal discussion of the subject, instead of a historical account, which, if well done, would have been of real value.

I have noted a considerable number of misprints, such as "Zeno of Elia" (p. 9), "Sterling" for "Stirling" (p. 26b), "Emmingshaus" for "Ebbinghaus" (p. 4ob), "Bradley, Studies in Logic" for "Principles of Logic" (p. 78b), "McTaggert" for "McTaggart" (p. 278b), "Affective in" for "in affective" (224a), "Adeckes" for "Adickes" (246a), "Chevreul" for "Chevreuil" (228b), "moves" for "motives" (229b), "Abbot" for "Abbott" (364b and 382b) "nature" for "naturalism" (312b), "Einführung" for "Einführung" (312b), "Mill's Logic 1893" for "1843" (32ob), "Mansell" for "Mansel" (371b), "Sentential" for "Sententiae" (537a), "Sophisticae Elenchi" for "Sophistici" (554b), "Content (q. v. 2)" for "3" (56ob), "Taylor" for "Tylor" (625a).

There are many other minor misprints, some of which have been already noted, and there is a great deal of very bad English.

On the whole I am convinced that, if the book is to be of real use, it must have a very thorough revision by some competent person. Professor Baldwin in his preface warns off the individual critic by assuring him that "there is hardly anything in the work which has not the support of a group of men of the highest authority. This should be remembered by the single writer or student who finds this or that point unsatisfactory. He is one: we are many." The single writer may content himself with replying that the men of authority have much to answer for. The counting of many heads is not a test of truth, and the fact that the work is "written by many hands" only makes its errors the less excusable.

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LEADERS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.


One is bound, unless perhaps one shared Mr. Mellone's view of religious experience, to say that the title of his volume is not jus-
The writers actually dealt with are Newman, Martineau, Comte, Spencer and Browning; and it is impossible to conceive any impartial principle of choice or exclusion upon which this somewhat mixed company could be said to be or to represent the "leaders of religious thought in the nineteenth century."

The author does not make any claim to originality, except in some degree as regards the view taken of Browning's teaching, but, though not particularly novel, his expositions and criticisms are always presented in a clear, simple and interesting way. Perhaps the best of the critical chapters is that on Martineau, and with one line of thought in Martineau's religious philosophy the author connects what he has to say positively about the nature of religion (in the chapter entitled "What is Religious Experience?")

This positive view he would describe as "Symbolism." "Every visible and invisible creature may become to us an appearance of God. . . . The presence of God may be discerned in the manifold experiences of life, in different degrees and with diverse values; and the highest value as a Divine manifestation belongs to the Ideals which humanity forms, in advance of all its past experience and attainment" (p. 154). Such "Symbolism," we are told, must be distinguished from "Mysticism," which "has always supposed that the experience of God can only be reached by means which are independent of the ordinary experiences of life" (p. 156). And this is unquestionably an important distinction. But it is less clear how such "Symbolism" is to be distinguished from what may be called a Hegelian Positivism. It differs apparently from the Positivism of Comte in discerning the presence of God in nature as well as in humanity; but in proportion as the presence of God is held to be most clearly manifested in human ideals, this difference seems to become unimportant. Now when we speak of our consciousness of ideals as being the very presence of God in us, there is always the danger that this statement may be read from the other end. The presence of God in us, it may be said, is just another name for our consciousness of ideals. The symbol and the reality fall together, or we can distinguish the reality from this particular symbol only by saying that it has other symbols or manifestations. It is not easy to see how Mr. Mellone can logically get beyond this positivism or philosophical pantheism, or how the vague sentiment of the religious experience from which he starts
can be prevented from shrinking up, when “interpreted” (to use his own expression), into just this philosophical doctrine, in which it seems to lose all its religious quality.

H. Barker.


Whether the critic is prepared to ascend to Dr. Oakesmith's doctrine, that “around Plutarch's Religion revolves his conception of life,” or not, he must nevertheless acknowledge gratefully that this essay fulfills its purpose in an admirable way. The author endeavors “to ascertain, from Plutarch's own account of his views, the principles, the method and character of his Religion; to learn in what manner he conceives the supernatural world and its relation to the human mind and to human interests; to discover and illustrate the processes by which these results are obtained; to note their philosophic bearing and tendency; and to exemplify their application in the sphere of practical ethics.” To this endeavor the author brings the qualifications of great learning, of careful study of both Plutarch and his critics, of genuine sympathy with, and consequent real insight into, the mind of Plutarch in its attitude towards the problems of his age. The result is an interesting and valuable picture of a man of good taste and great learning, who has no special philosophical school either to attack or to defend but soberly and with a sound mind tries to ascertain the true facts of life by diligent inquiry into the history of the past. “There was not a tendency of Greek philosophy with whose history and results he was not familiarly acquainted; there was not a school from which he did not borrow something for introduction into the texture of his own thought;”—in other words, Plutarch was typically Greek in two characteristic aspects—as a disinterested seeker after truth, in his application of the maxim, “Moderation in all things,” to every department of life and thought. The wealth of illustration with which Plutarch exemplifies or justifies his views makes the “Opera Morala” a mine of information upon the manner, beliefs, customs of a century peculiarly interesting alike to the profane historian and to the Christian student. It is by no means the least service rendered by this essay that it enables the “average