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JPE SELECTED FOR INCLUSION IN CENTURY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

The Journal of Political Economy has been chosen for inclusion in the Century of Social Sciences, a bibliographic database published by Thomson ISI that includes comprehensive backfile and cited reference data from 1900 to 1955 for the most influential social sciences research of the 20th century. As one of the oldest and most prestigious journals in economics, the JPE is proud to be selected for this esteemed bibliographic collection.

MILTON FRIEDMAN ON ECONOMICS BOOK NOW AVAILABLE

Upon his death in the autumn of 2006, Milton Friedman was lauded as “the grandmaster of free-market economic theory in the postwar era” by The New York Times and “the most influential economist of the second half of the twentieth century” by The Economist. Winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1976, Friedman was both a highly respected economist and a prominent public intellectual, the leader of a revolution in economic and political thought that argued robustly in favor of the virtues of free markets and laissez-faire policies.

Press Release

City dwellers bear disproportionate federal tax burden

Live in an expensive city? Think you pay too much in federal taxes? If so, a study in the current issue of the Journal of Political Economy finds that you’re exactly right.

Seven University of Chicago Press Journals in Thomson ISI’s Century of Social Sciences Database

Study Separates Russian Flat Tax Myth and Fact

A study published in the Journal of Political Economy finds that flat tax reform in Russia decreased tax evasion, but did little to increase real income for households

In the News

Featured in Atlantic Monthly
"City Residents Pay More... Taxes" August 21, 2009

The Unequal Geographic Burden of Federal Taxation

David Albouy

Featured in Guardian
"From Russia with Laffer, a tax cut tale" June 23, 2009

Myth and Reality of Flat Tax Reform: Micro Estimates of Tax Evasion Response and Welfare Effects in Russia


"The study on Russia, published in this month's Journal of Political Economy, found that although the tax cut did increase tax compliance, it did nothing to boost the work ethic." --Christopher Swann, columnist for Reuters

August 2002

Volume 110, Number 4
[Journal of Political Economy, 2002, vol. 110, no. 4]
0022-3808/2002/11004-0002$10.00
DOI: 10.1086/340775

Lobbying Legislatures

Morten Bennedsen

Copenhagen Business School, Centre for Economic and Business Research, and Centre for Industrial Economics

Sven E. Feldmann

University of Chicago

We analyze informational lobbying in the context of a multimember legislature that decides on the allocation of a public good. First, we observe that a majoritarian legislature provides widely different incentives for interest groups to lobby than a single decision maker does. Second, we compare a decentralized legislature, such as the U.S. Congress, to a parliament with strong party cohesion. Congress’s decentralized nature allows the strategic formation of policy coalitions among high‐demand districts and the exclusion of low‐demand districts. This increases the incentive to provide information about districts’ demand relative to a legislature in which the governing coalition is fixed.

Cited by

Emeric Henry. (2009) Strategic Disclosure of Research Results: The Cost of Proving Your Honesty. The Economic Journal 119:539, 1036-1064
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Brian Knight. (2008) Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and The Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence From The Us Congress*. The Economic Journal 118:532, 1785-1803
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Matthias Dahm, Nicolás Porteiro. (2008) Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform. Journal of the European Economic Association 6:5, 1057-1077
Online publication date: 1-Oct-2008.
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Matthias Dahm, Nicolás Porteiro. (2008) Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure. Social Choice and Welfare 30:4, 531-559
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Ernesto Dal Bó, Pedro Dal Bó, Rafael Di Tella. (2007) Reputation When Threats and Transfers Are Available. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 16:3, 577-598
Online publication date: 1-Oct-2007.
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RAJ CHARI, GARY MURPHY, JOHN HOGAN. (2007) Regulating Lobbyists: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, Canada, Germany and the European Union. The Political Quarterly 78:3, 422-438
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Johan N. M. Lagerlöf. (2007) A theory of rent seeking with informational foundations. Economics of Governance 8:3, 197-218
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Leonardo Felli, Antonio Merlo. (2007) If You Cannot Get Your Friends Elected, Lobby Your Enemies. Journal of the European Economic Association 5:2-3, 624-635
Online publication date: 1-May-2007.
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Mike Felgenhauer. (2007) Policy Bias Equivalence under Common Agency. Journal of Economics 90:3, 295-312
Online publication date: 1-May-2007.
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Per G. Fredriksson, Daniel L. Millimet. (2007) Legislative Organization and Pollution Taxation. Public Choice 131:1-2, 217-242
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Lars Frisell, Johan N. M. Lagerlöf. (2007) A Model of Reputation in Cheap Talk. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 109:1, 49-70
Online publication date: 1-Apr-2007.
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Morten Bennedsen, Sven E. Feldmann. (2007) Lobbying Bureaucrats. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 108:4, 643-668
Online publication date: 1-Jan-2007.
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David P. Baron. (2007) Competitive Lobbying and Supermajorities in a Majority-rule Institution. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 108:4, 607-642
Online publication date: 1-Jan-2007.
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John M. de Figueiredo. Integrated political strategy. , 459-486.
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  • We thank David Baron, Francesco Caselli, Steve Levitt, Massimo Morelli, Kasper Nielsen, Christian Schultz, Kenneth Shepsle, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.

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